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Abstract
We document an effect of survey participation on household saving. Indentification comes
from random assignment to modules within a population-representative internet panel. The
saving measure is based on linked administrative wealth data. Households that responded to a
detailed questionnaire on needs in retirement reduced their non-housing saving rate by 3.5 per-
centage points, on a base of 1.5%. The survey may have acted as a salience shock, possibly with
respect to reduced housing costs in retirement. Our findings present an important challenge
to survey designers. They also add to the evidence of limited attention in household financial
decision making.
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Much empirical research in economics analyses data from surveys of individuals and households.
The development of panel surveys has allowed researchers to assess and account for heterogeneity
and dynamics in economic behaviour. However, repeated data collection from the same individ-
uals or households brings a risk of “survey effects” – the possibility that questioning individuals
about their actions or attitudes in a particular domain can alter their later behaviour. Finding
significant survey effects in important areas of economic research would require a rethinking of
data collection strategies. More positively, finding such effects might also provide insight into the
cognitive processes underlying broader economic behaviour.
In this paper, we test for survey effects in a central domain of economic research: household
saving behaviour. In particular, we test whether being asked questions about retirement income
needs leads to changes in household saving behaviour. Recent work in behavioural finance sug-
gests possible mechanisms for survey effects on saving behaviour. Limited attention means that in-
dividuals tend to overlook some of the consequences of their decisions (DellaVigna, 2009). If those
unnoticed consequences materialise in the future, as do the benefits of saving today, this results
in biases that are similar to those induced by limited self-control (Karlan et al., 2012). However, in
contrast to self-control problems, limited attention suggests that behaviour might be corrected by
focusing individuals’ attention on the aspects they are missing. For example, recent literature sug-
gests that sending out mailings can induce desired behaviour (such as tax compliance or personal
care) cost effectively (see Fellner et al., 2013; Altmann and Traxler, 2014, and Hallsworth et al., 2014).
To the extent that surveys on retirement planning can direct participants’ attention, they may have
behavioural effects, though the direction of such effects is not clear a priori.
Our research design has a number of critical features. First, we study survey effects in a large
representative survey of a developed country population (the Netherlands). Second, we study ef-
fects on a key life-cycle choice: the level of savings. Third, the randomised allocation of members
of an internet panel to a survey module on retirement income needs provides for clean identifi-
cation of the causal effect of participating in that survey module. Fourth, we measure household
saving with linked administrative data – not with responses in subsequent panel surveys. This
allows us to rule out the possibility that any observed effect is on reporting, rather than on the
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underlying saving behaviour. No prior study combines all these attributes.
In an environment in which public and occupational pension schemes implied high income
replacement rates in retirement (the Netherlands in 2008), we find robust evidence that exposure to
the retirement needs module subsequently led to lower average household saving. This mean effect
is driven by older and more educated households. These households have the highest expected
pension wealth and higher housing wealth. They are also much more likely, in the survey, to
report that their housing costs will fall in retirement (perhaps because they anticipate paying off
their mortgage debt). Our interpretation is that the survey module directed attention to aspects of
retirement preparedness and needs that were not otherwise salient, and for wealthy households
this apparently implied that they should save less.
The survey methods literature has long been concerned with “panel conditioning”: the way
in which experience in a panel survey affects subjects’ responses. Several studies have examined
panel conditioning in domains such as subjective well-being (Van Landeghem, 2014), marital sat-
isfaction (Glenn, 1998), and preferences (Binswanger et al., 2013). Much of this literature compares
experienced panel members with refreshment samples or other novice respondents. As pointed
out by Das et al. (2011), disentangling panel conditioning from unobserved factors influencing at-
trition is a complex task. Das et al. (2011) conclude that, after controlling for unobserved attrition
factors, there are significant panel conditioning effects in knowledge questions but not in other
types of questions.1 Our design, based on random invitations to a survey module, avoids con-
cerns about attrition as well age and time effects. In a recent review paper, Warren and Halpern-
Manners (2012) note that the survey research literature on panel conditioning generally failed to
employ randomised designs. They also point out that to date, there is little systematic evidence
on panel conditioning in large-scale longitudinal social science surveys. Our paper addresses this
concern as well.
The psychology and marketing literatures have documented a number of related behavioural
phenomena. The “question-behaviour effect” refers to the observation that asking respondents to
1Das et al. consider a range of questions related to knowledge and behaviour, food choice, attitudes towards immi-
gration, and pensions. The only questions that are related to the present paper concern knowledge and expectations
with respect to pensions. Generally, they do not find evidence of panel conditioning for those questions, with one
exception, a knowledge question about a specific institutional feature of the Dutch pension system.
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predict future behaviour results in more of the behaviour under consideration (Dholakia, 2010).
For example, Spangenberg (1997) shows that asking people to predict their workout behaviour in-
duces them to visit the gym more often. Where the behaviour in question is normatively desirable
this is sometimes called the “self-prophecy effect” (Sherman, 1980), and where it is normatively
ambiguous, the “mere measurement effect” (Morwitz et al., 1993). Several papers have also shown
that surveying people about risky behaviours can increase the propensity to engage in those be-
haviours (Fitzsimons and Shiv, 2001; Fitzsimons and Moore, 2008; Dholakia, 2010). The public
health literature reports some evidence that supports the use of self-recording of behaviour as a
behavioural change intervention (Michie et al., 2011a,b; Burke et al., 2011), though recently Ax-
inn et al. (2015) found little evidence of behavioural effects of keeping survey diaries of sexual
behaviour for extended periods (up to 30 months).
The effects documented in these literatures connect questions about the intention to, or likeli-
hood of, engaging in specific behaviours, or the recording of specific behaviours, to the propensity
to engage in those behaviours. The survey effects that we study are less direct. We investigate the
effect of being surveyed about topics related to the behaviour of interest, rather than direct ques-
tions about that behaviour. The question module that is our treatment has no specific questions
about saving behaviour.
Two further relevant studies are Zwane et al. (2011) and Stango and Zinman (2013). Like us they
consider survey effects that result from being surveyed on a topic related to the behaviour of inter-
est, rather than from direct questions about that behaviour, or self-recording of that behaviour. Fur-
thermore, they use administrative data to measure outcomes, in order to isolate genuine changes
in behaviour from changes in reporting style. Zwane et al. (2011) study the effect of randomly
assigning subjects to extra survey monitoring in the context of five randomised controlled trials
of interventions in developing countries. They find that survey monitoring significantly increases
the probability of water treatment product usage and medical insurance usage. They do not find
effects for micro-lending take-up or renewal. Stango and Zinman (2013) show that participants
in a marketing research panel that enter a survey with general questions about overdrafts and
overdrafts fees are less likely to incur such fees in the same month, and in subsequent months.
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Their interpretation is that the surveys with overdraft questions act as “salience shocks” which
help respondents avoid costs arising from limited attention.
Our paper differs from Zwane et al. (2011) and Stango and Zinman (2013) in that the analysis
is based on a large population-representative survey used by social science researchers, and that
the survey effects we study concern a central life-cycle choice – the level of saving. It may be
much more difficult to shift choices of important real quantities like consumption, saving or labor
supply, than it is to induce small changes in the timing of transactions or portfolio composition, or
to encourage the avoidance of fees. To our knowledge, there is no prior evidence on survey effects
on core life-cycle choices like the level of savings or consumption. Our analysis further differs
from Zwane et al. (2011) in that the data are drawn from a developed economy, and from Stango
and Zinman (2013) in having a randomised design.
Our findings present a significant challenge to survey designers and to the collection of lon-
gitudinal data in general, and data on the important economic topics of saving behaviour and
retirement preparation in particular. Measurement is not innocuous. Even a random sample of
a population, which has not been subject to nonrandom attrition, can fail to be representative of
the population under study if the act of measurement alters the behaviour of sample members.
More positively, this study demonstrates the value of randomised survey content in allowing for
the exploration of such effects.
Our results also significantly extend the evidence base for the importance of limited attention
in household financial decision making (Stango and Zinman, 2013; Karlan et al., 2012). We show
that survey questions can alter choices with respect to a key life-cycle variable, the overall level
of saving. Our findings also demonstrate that salience shocks can shift behaviour in different
directions, depending on the context. While Karlan et al. (2012) find that deliberate and targeted
reminders raise contributions to goal-specific savings accounts in Bolivia, Peru and the Philippines,
we find that exposure to a module of questions about retirement income needs lowered overall
saving in the Netherlands. We also find quite different patterns of effect heterogeneity. While
Stango and Zinman (2013) find larger effects of being surveyed among lower-educated subjects,
we find the largest effects among the high-education group. We discuss this further below.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the institutional context of our
study. Section 2 describes the research design, data and methods. In section 3, we present the main
results as well as a number of robustness checks and falsification tests. Section 4 concludes.
1. Institutional Context
Active saving will reflect the economic circumstances that households face and so to interpret the
results that follow, some background is required. The Dutch pension system in 2008 was char-
acterised by arrangements that were almost universal and provided extremely generous income
replacement.
The Dutch system of income provision during retirement consists of four categories or “pil-
lars”. The first pillar is that of the public pension, which provides anyone who lived in the Nether-
lands between the ages of 15 and 65 with a subsistence income. Coverage of the public pension is
close to universal, since uninterrupted residence in the country is the only criterion (benefits are
cut by 2% for each year spent abroad).2 The level of the public pension is set with reference to the
minimum wage. Since public pensions only provide a minimum income, almost all employees ac-
cumulate additional entitlements in occupational pensions (the second pillar). Such arrangements
cover 90% of all employees and are usually organised at the level of the sector or of the company
(Bovenberg and Meijdam, 2001). Participation in the first two pillars is mandatory and together
they replace, on average, 70% of the gross last earned income before retirement. This translates
into replacement rates net of taxes above 80% (Kapteyn and De Vos, 1999; Bovenberg and Mei-
jdam, 2001). The third pillar contains all private savings vehicles that are aimed specifically at
retirement, such as life annuities, and these accounted for 7% of retirement income on average in
the relevant period. Such voluntary arrangements are especially important for individuals that
cannot rely on occupational pensions, such as the self employed. Finally, the remainder of retire-
ment income comes from the fourth pillar which contains all other forms of wealth that can be
drawn down after retirement, such as savings accounts, investments, and real estate.
2Technically, one accrues public pension rights if one’s income is subject to Dutch income taxes. Residence abroad
does not affect the accumulation of entitlements as long as income is taxed within the Dutch system.
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There were no major changes to the Dutch pension system between 2002 and 2013, except
for the move away from tax exempt early retirement schemes towards actuarially fair adjustment
of benefits which took place between 2000 and 2006; see Kapteyn and De Vos (1999, 2007) and
Kapteyn et al. (2010) for further descriptions of the Dutch pension system during the period cov-
ered by our study.
De Bresser and Knoef (2015) use responses to the retirement needs module in the LISS panel
(our treatment) combined with the administrative wealth data we used in this study and other
data to analyse whether the Dutch pension system succeeded in providing an adequate retirement
income to its contributors around the time of our study. They compare projected annuities from
pensions and non-pension savings with the self-reported minimal and desired expenditure levels
from the retirement needs module. Respondents report rather high minimum expenditure re-
quirements, on average 50% higher than the highest official poverty line of Statistics Netherlands.
Nevertheless, a majority of close to 70% can still expect to exceed their own minimum expenditure
level using their funds in the first two pillars of the system. The extent of over-saving is substantial:
the median difference relative to what would be required to maintain the self-reported minimum
expenditure floor is 25% taking only the first two pillars of the retirement saving system into ac-
count; and this rises to 36% if the authors take non-pension, non-housing savings into account.
Moreover, the median difference between the annuity from pensions and non-housing wealth and
the self-reported desired expenditure level is 18%. Thus it seems that at the time the retirement
module was fielded in LISS (in 2008), a large fraction of the population could significantly reduce
their savings and still meet their post-retirement expenditure goals.
Another important aspect of the institutional context of our study is that beginning in 2008,
individuals could find detailed information on their personal pension entitlements in their Uni-
form Pension Overview (UPO). These UPOs provide all members of pension funds, in both the
second and third pillars, with yearly updates on their current entitlements and projected future
entitlements at age 65. UPOs have been mandatory for all financial institutions in the Netherlands
since January 1st, 2008.
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Panel complete online surveys on a regular basis. These surveys collect data on a range of core
demographic, financial, health, and social topics. The LISS has two features that are crucial to our
study.
First, eligible respondents are selected randomly to be asked to complete additional, non-core
survey modules. These modules are typically designed and submitted by researchers and fielded
only once. Researchers can specify a subset of the LISS panel as eligible for their module. Re-
searchers’ required sample size often does not exhaust the full subset of eligibles, so costs are
reduced by randomly choosing eligible panel members to be asked to complete the module. The
treatment we study is a module of questions on expected needs in retirement and preferences for
current versus retirement consumption (henceforth, the “retirement needs module”). This module
was fielded in January 2008 and it was the first randomly assigned module in the LISS Panel.
Second, we can measure household saving through linkage to records in the Dutch national
tax record system between 2007 and 2009. This system records detailed information on assets
and debt across different asset classes at the beginning of the calendar year. We are thus able
to construct a very accurate measure of saving for 2008 and 2007: the years immediately after
and before treatment. Critically, an independent measure of saving is necessary to be sure that
observed effects represent genuine behavioural change, and not changes in survey reporting style.
Details of these data sources and our research design are as follows.
2.1. The LISS Panel
The LISS Panel is a representative random sample from the Dutch population that was initiated
during the autumn of 2007. The LISS Panel is administered by CentERdata, a survey research in-
stitute affiliated with Tilburg University, and follows close to 8,000 individuals from 5,000 house-
holds. Surveys are administered over the internet. Though the Netherlands has a high rate of
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
internet access (more than 80% of Dutch households are connected), CentERdata safeguards rep-
resentativeness by providing sample households with an internet subscription and a simple com-
puter when necessary. Scherpenzeel (2011) provides details on the design and sample.
2.2. Treatment
We define treatment as participation in the first randomly assigned module in the LISS Panel– the
retirement needs module. This module, formally titled “What is an adequate old age income?” was
designed to study preferences and attitudes relating to living standards in retirement. The module
was first fielded in an older internet panel (the CentERpanel) and the resulting data are analysed
in Binswanger and Schunk (2012). The module was then fielded in the LISS panel in January 2008.
Binswanger et al. (2013) then compare responses to the module across the two panels to study how
differences in responses between experienced (CentERpanel) and novice (LISS) respondents. They
find greater nonresponse among novice respondents, but little difference between experienced and
novice panel members conditional on response. Note that the survey effects they study are very
different from the effects studied in this paper. They compare novice and experienced panel mem-
bers, all of whom receive the retirement needs module, to estimate the effect of past experience
with an internet panel on survey responses (particularly responses to this module). We compare
novice panel members who received the retirement needs module to novice panel members who
did not, in order to estimate the effect or receiving this module on actual savings behaviour (mea-
sured independently of the survey).
It is important to emphasise that all the subjects we study were novice panel members, and
none had previously been exposed to randomised survey content. Eligible panel members who
were not offered the retirement needs module were not offered another module. Moreover ran-
dom assignment to the retirement needs module was independent of assignment to all subsequent
modules. Thus the effect we study is receiving the module versus not receiving it, and not a com-
parison between this module and some other module, or sequence of modules.
Eligibility for the survey was limited to all LISS members that were 25 years or older, who had
a net household income of at least 800 euro per month, and who were either the head of the house-
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hold or his/her partner (children or other household members were excluded from participation).
This lead to a total eligible sample of 5,435 individuals, 2,755 of which were selected at random
and were offered the retirement needs module. Multiple members of a household can be members
of the LISS panel, and so households may contain zero, one or two eligible individuals. The 5,435
eligible individuals were members of 3,125 households.
The basic unit of our analysis is the household since, as elaborated below, we measure both
wealth and income at the household level. We classify a household as eligible if it contained at least
one eligible individual, and we define a household as ”‘offered”’ if at least one household member
that was eligible for the retirement needs module received the request to participate. Similarly,
we define a household as treated if at least one household member was offered the module and
actually completed the module. The completion rate among those who received the offer was 74%
at the individual level and 79% at the household level.
The retirement needs module consists of around 60 items that concern desired expenditure
levels in retirement, the tradeoff between current and future consumption, and risk attitudes with
respect to income after retirement.
• The module starts by asking how much respondents have thought about retirement and
whether they would be willing to cut down on housing expenditures when they stop work-
ing.
• The next two questions elicit expectations with regard to the evolution of housing costs dur-
ing the first decade following retirement: the general direction, decrease/roughly equal/increase,
followed by the expected change in euro per year.
• After having been primed in this way to consider housing as an important, and potentially
changing, category of expenditures, respondents are asked what the minimum expenditure
level is that they would never want to fall below during retirement. Respondents then com-
pare this minimal expenditure level with their current expenditures and indicate the rea-
soning behind their answer (e.g. summing projected expenditures in different categories or
taking a certain fraction of current income or expenditures).
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• After reporting their minimal expenditures during retirement, a series of multiple choice
questions elicits desired expenditures by means of choices between different expenditure
paths during working life and retirement.
• The questions on desired expenditure levels are followed by a series of choices between lot-
teries that involve income streams during retirement, to measure (domain-specific) risk pref-
erences, and a vignette question in which respondents indicate whether they agree that one
hypothetical lifetime expenditure path is preferable to another.
• Finally, respondents are asked a question about their willingness to pay for prevention of
climate change and they evaluate how difficult they found the questionnaire.
The exact wording of the questions can be found in Binswanger and Schunk (2012).
Importantly, the module neither provided respondents with any information about the Dutch
system of retirement income provision in general, nor about respondents’ personal entitlements in
particular. Thus, the randomised survey module did not constitute an information shock. Since the
survey did not include any questions on predicted or intended savings either, the randomised sur-
vey module could not induce a question-behaviour effect; respondents were not asked to predict
their own behaviour.
2.3. Saving Measures
We investigate the effect of survey participation on household saving. Though the LISS data
include elaborate biannual surveys on assets and debt, we construct our saving measure from
matched administrative data on wealth for two reasons. First, we want to isolate effects of survey
participation on economic behaviour. If we found an effect of survey participation on self-reported
savings, this could reflect altered survey-reporting styles rather than altered economic behaviour.
Deriving our outcome measures from administrative data eliminates that concern. Second, there
is a general concern about the quality of self-reported survey data on assets (Bound et al., 2001).
The administrative wealth data we use are taken from the Complete Asset Data of the Nether-
lands (Integraal Vermogensbestand, CAD), which was constructed by Statistics Netherlands. The
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
CAD is based on tax records, which are supplemented with information from banks. The CAD
contains a detailed decomposition of household-level wealth for the entire Dutch population. It
measures assets on the first of January for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 (data for more recent
years are not yet released at the time of writing). Available records thus allow us to compute
yearly savings during 2007 and 2008 as the differences between wealth stocks on January 1st of
consecutive years. Note that the timing is ideal for measuring the effect of a module fielded in Jan-
uary of 2008. We compute these wealth stocks net of the value of the primary residence, because
we want to focus on pure savings and housing has an important consumption component. The
use of administrative data on changes in wealth to measure savings and consumption is becoming
more common; see Browning et al. (2013) for a recent example and Browning et al. (2014) for a brief
survey of the advantages and disadvantages of such data.
Many studies of household savings behaviour are limited by having only data on specific as-
sets or accounts.3 Thus, changes in contributions may represent portfolio reshuffling rather than
changes in net saving. In contrast, a strength of our data is that we observe an almost complete
measure of wealth. The categories of assets that we observe are checking and saving accounts,
bonds, stocks, property, other real estate, business capital and other tangibles. For debt, the CAD
distinguishes between mortgage and other debt. We miss savings held in small accounts because
banks are not obliged to report accounts with a balance of less than 500 euro or less than 15 euros
in interest payments. We also do not observe debt for households without capital income. Finally,
we miss savings held in tax-exempt private retirement (“third pillar”) pensions. Such accounts
are taxed only during the payout phase and are therefore invisible in tax records up to retirement.
However, they were not very important during the period we study, since annuities contributed
only 7% of household retirement income (Bovenberg and Meijdam, 2001). While we do not ob-
serve holdings in such accounts in the administrative data, we do have information from the LISS
assets survey (one of the core surveys that are answered by all panel households). Thus we do
have a check on changes in saving in these accounts.
In our analysis of savings, we look both at levels, in euro per year, and rates, which are levels
3For example, in Duflo et al. (2006), Karlan et al. (2012), and in many studies of individual retirement accounts, the
outcome variables are contributions to one account; see Crossley et al. (2012) for a discussion.
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divided by yearly disposable income. The data on the yearly disposable income of households
are also taken from tax records. We use the Complete Household Income Data of the Nether-
lands (Integraal Huishoudens Inkomstenbestand, CHID), assembled by Statistics Netherlands.
The measure for primary income in the CHID is quite complete: in addition to labor income it
includes income from entrepreneurship and from assets (interest payments and imputed rent for
homeowners). Disposable income is defined as primary income plus government transfers that
the household received minus the transfers and taxes paid by the household. The administrative
income measure that we use is likely to be more accurate than survey measures of income since in-
formation about the various income streams is provided electronically by employers and financial
institutions to the tax authority.
2.4. Matching Survey and Administrative Data and Sample Selection
The construction of our estimation sample starts with 3,125 households that contain at least one
member that was eligible for the retirement needs module according to the criteria mentioned in
section 2.2. Incomplete linkage is often an important concern when combining survey and admin-
istrative data. Out of the 3,125 households that contain at least one member that was eligible for
the retirement needs module, we could find administrative data matches for only 1,602. Respon-
dent refusal of consent for matching can be a reason for incomplete linkage (Sakshaug et al., 2012)
but in our case panel attrition is a bigger problem. Informed consent for the match of LISS data
with administrative records was elicited only in September of 2011, almost four years after the
retirement needs module was fielded, and by this time many of the households who were eligible
for the retirements needs module had attritted from the panel. De Bresser and Knoef (2015) show
that only 10% of the respondents to the retirement needs module that were still in the LISS Panel
in 2011 refused consent to the administrative data linkage. After matching the LISS respondents
to administrative data, we obtain wealth records for 1,429, 1,437 and 1,449 households in the years
2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively.
We drop those households for which all eligible members were retired in 2008, reducing the
sample to 1,275 households. Even with accurately measured administrative data, there can be
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large outliers in ratio variables. We trim all households for which 2008 savings rates relative to
after-tax household income were larger than 50% in absolute value, leaving us with an estimation
sample of 999 households. We also tried trimming the sample at savings rates larger than 75 and
100% of net household income and found quantitatively similar results to those reported below.4
Table 1 compares our matched estimation sample to a “full” eligible sample from the LISS that
excludes only households for which all eligible members were retired in 2008 (from the 3,125 eligi-
ble LISS households this produces a sample of 2,816 households). We provide descriptive statistics
for these two samples separately for couples and singles. Couples are households in which two
partners live together irrespective of their marital status, and among couples, individual-specific
attributes (such as gender and age) are reported for the head of the household. For both couples
and singles, these samples are very similar in terms of observables.
Table 2 summarises, for our matched estimation sample, administrative assets records for the
years 2007, 2008, and 2009 (all in 2008 euros). The single most important category of assets is that
of the primary residence, with an average value of around 200,000 euro. Savings accounts follow at
great distance as the second most important type both in terms of mean (27,000 euro) and median
(13,000 euro) value. Real estate other than the primary residence is also important, but only for a
small minority: the mean value is around 7,000 euro though only 8% of the sample has any non-
residential real estate. The mean value of risky assets, stocks and bonds, drops from 7,210 euro
in 2007 to 4,857 euro in 2009 (median holdings are zero in all years). Business wealth and other
wealth are the least important categories of assets with a mean value below 1,500 euro in all years.
On average, households have about 105,000–110,000 euro in mortgage debt and around 2,000–
2,500 euro of non-mortgage debt. Non-mortgage debt is concentrated in a small minority of 6% of
the sample, among which the mean non-mortgage debt is around 20,000 euro.
Taking assets and debt together, the mean net worth of the households in the sample is around
135,000 euro. Unsurprisingly, net worth is concentrated in the primary residence, which has a
mean value net of mortgage of around 95,000 euro. Because of the consumption value of housing,
we compute savings based on the remaining 40,000 euro of non-housing savings.
4These additional estimates are available on request.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Covariates
Couples Singles
Full sample (LISS) Estimation sample Full sample (LISS) Estimation sample
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Female 0.12 (0.32) 0.11 (0.32) 0.58 (0.49) 0.62 (0.49)
Age 47.4 (11.8) 46.9 (11.5) 45.4 (12.1) 44.6 (11.6)
Children 1.16 (1.15) 1.15 (1.16) 0.41 (0.81) 0.36 (0.78)
Homeowner 0.83 (0.38) 0.81 (0.40) 0.49 0.50) 0.42 (0.50)
Marital status
Married 0.81 (0.39) 0.83 (0.38) 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.19)
Separated/divorced 0.05 (0.23) 0.04 (0.20) 0.33 (0.47) 0.38 (0.49)
Widowed 0.002 (0.04) 0.001 (0.04) 0.10 (0.30) 0.07 (0.25)
Never married 0.13 (0.34) 0.11 (0.32) 0.51 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50)
Education
Primary 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.29)
Int. Secondary 0.23 (0.42) 0.25 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.26 (0.44)
Higher secondary 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.25)
Int. vocational 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43)
Higher vocational 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.28 (0.45)
University 0.11 (0.32) 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.30) 0.06 (0.25)
Most important activity
Employed 0.72 (0.45) 0.75 (0.43) 0.69 (0.46) 0.70 (0.46)
Self employed 0.11 (0.31) 0.07 (0.26) 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.28)
HH work 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.05 (0.21) 0.06 (0.23
Retired 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.32) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Disabled 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.17) 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.25)
Other 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29)
N 2167 (77.0%) 768 (76.9%) 649 (23.0%) 231 (23.1%)
For couples all individual-specific variables refer to the head of the household.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Assets and Debt Variables
2007 2008 2009
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Assets
Saving accounts 25,551 12,799 40,870 26,728 12,728 42,568 28,008 13,196 44,963
Risky assets 7,210 0 23,974 6,627 0 22,560 4,857 0 17,468
Property 196,713 205,571 162,020 201,325 212,589 161,463 199,616 212,181 155,063
Real estate 9,808 0 53,750 6,906 0 41,722 7,689 0 44,442
Business 1,202 0 12,588 1,212 0 13,842 1,459 0 15,485
Other 861 0 9,914 959 0 10,871 1,014 0 10,779
Debt
Mortgage 105,119 86,091 105,553 104,079 84,827 103,787 108,243 91,412 106,892
Non-mortgage debt 2,375 0 13,796 1,992 0 12,621 2,432 0 18,823
Net worth 133,852 78,760 172,072 137,687 81,551 170,305 131,968 77,021 167,938
Net housing wealth 91,594 40,984 131,904 97,246 47,128 128,481 91,374 43,949 124,627
Net worth excl. housing 42,258 16,292 82,970 40,440 15,643 76,797 40,594 15,232 77,325
N 983 999 999
All assets and debt are reported in 2008 euros.
2.5. Threats to Validity
Our analysis faces three threats to internal validity. Figure 1 provides an overview of the issues.
The first threat is that the randomisation of the offer was performed at the level of the indi-
vidual while the outcome variables we analyse are measured at the household level. We classify
a household as being offered the survey if at least one eligible member received the offer, so by
construction households with multiple eligible members are more likely to receive the offer. Thus
we have conditionally random allocation to treatment and control: conditional on the number of
eligible household members, randomisation across individuals ensures that the offer is random at
the household level. Therefore in all of the regressions reported in the next section, we control for
the presence of multiple household members. As in practice eligible households have either one
or two eligible members, this amounts to including in our regression models a dummy variable
equal to one if the household has a second eligible member.
We checked the conditional random allocation of households to treatment and control by re-
gressing our instrument (an indicator for being offered the retirement needs module), on all the
socio-demographic variables listed in Table 1 while controlling for the presence of multiple eligi-
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Figure 1: Overview of the Research Design
bles in the household. As expected, the dummy for multiple eligibles does predict receipt of offer
at the household level. However, conditional on this control, the other covariates are jointly in-
significant (p = 0.901). One-by-one balance tests also confirm that treatment and control groups
are similar in terms of demographics, with no statistically or economically significant differences.
Hence, the covariates are (conditionally) balanced, as one would expect given the conditional ran-
domisation.
The second issue is incomplete compliance with the offer of treatment: Not every LISS Panel
member who was offered the retirement needs module completed this module. We apply two
remedies. First, we perform an intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis that compares those who did re-
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ceive the offer with those who did not (instead of comparing those who were treated with those
who were not). Second, we perform instrumental variables (IV) analyses in which we use the (con-
ditionally) random offer of treatment as an instrument for being treated. Both methods allow us
to obtain estimates of treatment effects that are not affected by endogenous sample selection as a
result of non-compliance, since they rely on exogenous variation in the module offer.5
Our intention to treat analysis, exploiting the conditionally random allocation of eligible house-
holds to the offer of the retirement needs module, is implemented by estimating the following
regression:
Sh,t = β0 + β1IMEh + β2Zh + eh,t (1)
where Sh,t is the saving (level or rate) of household h at time t; IMEh is an indicator variable for
the presence of multiple eligibles in the household and Zh is our instrument, which is equal to
one if one of the eligibles in the household received the offer of the retirement-needs-module. The
parameter β2 is the Intention-to-treat (ITT) effect.
Our estimate of the treatment effect is obtained by estimating the equation:
Sh,t = α0 + α1IMEh + α2Th + uh,t (2)
where Th is the treatment dummy, equal to one if at least one of eligibles in the household received
the offer of the retirement needs module and completed the module. We estimate this equation
by instrumental variables with Zh as the instrument for Th. The parameter α2 is the treatment
effect. Importantly, the research design we use is characterised by one-sided non-compliance:
those respondents who were not randomly selected for the offer of the module could not complete
the module. Thus, the monotonicity requirement for the identification of local average treatment
effects (Angrist et al., 1996) is satisfied.
5This randomised assignment to a treatment and control group at a given point in time allows us to identify the
effect of the survey on behaviour. Other research questions could be answered using different randomisations, such as
randomised inclusion into a panel at different times in order to measure panel conditioning.
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In addition to IV regressions for the conditional mean of the savings distribution, we also esti-
mate decile treatment effects in order to establish the robustness of our results. We use the estima-
tor proposed in Fro¨lich and Melly (2013).6
The final threat to internal validity is the incomplete matching to the administrative data, de-
scribed above. This would invalidate our design if, among eligibles, selection into our estimation
sample were related to the offer of the retirements needs survey (that is, if selection were related
to our instrument). It is important to check whether this is the case.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the estimated sample is quite like full the sam-
ple of eligibles in terms of observables characteristics. However, one difference between the full
sample and the estimation sample that is not reported in Table 1 is the degree of compliance to the
survey offer. As noted above, in the full sample, 74% of individuals who were offered the survey
participated. Household-level compliance in the full sample is 5 percentage points higher at 79%.7
In the estimation sample, the corresponding compliance rates are 82% for individuals and 87% for
households. It is not surprising that compliance with the offer of the retirement needs module
is related to inclusion in the estimation sample. Non-compliers to the survey offer are also more
likely to leave the LISS Panel altogether. As a result, non-compliers were less likely to be present in
2011 to give consent for the match to administrative records. However, this does not compromise
our research design, so long as the instrument is orthogonal to this selection process.
In the next section, we formally test whether selection into the estimation sample is (mean)
independent of the instrument. We do this by estimating the following regression on the full
sample of eligible households:
IESh = γ0 + γ1IMEh + γ2Zh + vh (3)
where IESh is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the household is included in the estima-
tion sample. The hypothesis that inclusion in the sample is independent of the instrument implies
γ2 = 0, and this is our test.
6The Stata code we used for implementing this estimator is discussed in Fro¨lich and Melly (2010).
7Again, this is because some household have two eligibles who both received an offer and if either completes the
survey we consider the household to be treated.
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Table 3 presents summary statistics for net income and for the outcome variables (savings and
saving rates) used in the analysis. Statistics are presented for 2007 and 2008, and the matched esti-
mation sample of eligible households is split into those offered and not offered the module which
is our treatment (that is, values of our binary instrumental variable). In 2008 mean household in-
come is 36,479 euro for the not-offered group and 38,979 for the offered group. Both values are
slightly higher than the average of 33,100 euro for the Dutch population at large (Centraal Bureau
voor de Statistiek (CBS), 2012). This is unsurprising given that conditions for eligibility for the
module included a minimum income. The difference in mean incomes between the not-offered
and offered groups reflects the fact that random assignment of the module to eligibles occurred
at the level of the individual respondent, as described in the previous section. This means that
households with multiple eligible members were more likely to be offered, and so offered house-
holds are more likely to have multiple eligible members. Table 3 reveals that in 2008 82% of offered
households contained multiple eligibles while only 62% of not-offered households contained mul-
tiple eligibles. These differences, and the resulting income differences, emphasise again that, at the
household level, we have conditional random assignment to the offer of the module (conditional
on the number of eligibles in the household). As explained in the previous section, our empirical
strategy accounts for this.
In 2007 the mean level of savings among eligible households who were subsequently offered
the module was 1,207 euros, with a median of 1.6 euros. This is non-housing saving, computed as
the difference between the non-housing wealth stocks of January 1st 2007 and 2008. For eligible
households that were subsequently offered the module, mean savings were 1,247 euros, with a
median of 184 euros. Note that the savings levels are very disperse, with the standard deviation
in both groups about 9,000 euros. In the same year, the mean savings rates were 2.3% for the
not-offered and 1.7% for the offered. We compute savings rates as the level of savings divided by
after-tax income. The medians are respectively 0 and 1%. As with saving levels, savings rates are
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very disperse with a standard deviation of 18 percentage points in both groups.
In 2008 the mean saving rate of the not-offered group fell somewhat, to 1.6%. The mean saving
rate of the offered group fell much more, from 1.7% to (- 1.6)% (a fall of 3.1 percentage points).
This suggests that the participation in the module may have had an effect on the saving behaviour
of the 79% of the offered group that did participate. Note, however, that the saving rate of the
offered group in 2007 does not provide a credible counterfactual for the saving rate of that group
in 2008 (because of time effects). The saving rate of the non-offered group in 2008 also does not
provide a credible counterfactual for the saving rate of the offered in 2008 (because the groups
differ in the frequency of households with multiple eligibles). We now turn to the ITT and IV
estimators that provide a credible counterfactual and therefore credible estimates of the causal
effect of participation in the module.
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Table 3: Outcomes: Descriptive Statistics
a. 2007 Mean Std. dev. P25 P50 P75
Not offered
HH incomea 35,916 19,130 22,810 33,486 43,201
Level of savingsb 1,271 8,854 -1,627 1,594 3,770
Savings rate 0.023 0.176 -0.054 0.000 0.110
Hholds w. multiple eligibles 0.58
N 330
Offered
HH incomea 39,624 18,619 28,780 36,761 47,020
Level of savingsb 1,247 9,325 -2,295 184 4,270
Savings rate 0.017 0.178 -0.067 0.005 0.114
Hholds w. multiple eligibles 0.82
N 684
b. 2008 Mean Std. dev. P25 P50 P75
Not offered
HH incomea 36,479 19,320 24,241 33,940 44,169
Level of savingsb 1,105 9,513 -2,044 352 3,422
Savings rate 0.016 0.175 -0.062 0.010 0.108
Hholds w. multiple eligibles 0.62
Module Participation 0
N 325
Offered
HH incomea 38,978 16,739 28,223 36,787 46,661
Level of savingsb -305 9,334 -3,857 0.000 2,823
Savings rate -0.016 0.199 -0.112 0.000 0.082
Hholds w. multiple eligibles 0.82
Module Participation 0.79
N 674
a HH income net of taxes.
b Savings corrected for inflation and net of property value and mortgages.
All monetary variables in 2008 Euros.
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strategy if the matching of the LISS Panel observations with the administrative data were related
to the instrument, the offer of the retirement needs module. Table 4 shows estimates of Equation
3. This a linear regression that uses our instrument, called “offer”, and a dummy for households
with multiple eligibles, to explain an indicator of inclusion in the estimation sample. We find that
sample selection is not correlated with the offer of the retirement needs module, so the loss of
data that results from matching survey participants to administrative data does not invalidate our
research design.
Table 4: Exogeneity of the Instrument w.r.t. Data Linkage
Dependent variable: indicator for estimation sample
Offered -0.0209
(0.0201)
Multiple eligibles 0.00700
(0.0215)
Constant 0.364***
(0.0207)
Number of selected HHs 999
N 2,816
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Turning to instrument relevance, the first-stage regression reported in Table 5 demonstrates
that the instrument is highly relevant: the F -statistic for the coefficient of the instrument in a
model that controls for the presence of multiple eligibles is 4,818.37.
Together these two tables confirm that our empirical strategy overcomes both incomplete match-
ing of households to the administrative wealth data and noncompliance with the offer of module
participation.
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Table 5: First Stage
Dependent variable: HH treated
HH offered 0.879***
(0.0127)
Multiple eligibles -0.0376**
(0.0159)
Constant 0.0231**
(0.00988)
R squared 0.688
F(1, 996) 4,818.37***
N 999
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%
3.3. Main Results
Table 6 presents ITT estimates of the effect of (the offer of) survey participation on household
saving, both for the mean and at various quantiles. The top panel uses 2008 non-housing savings as
the outcome variable, while the bottom panel explains the 2008 savings rate (non-housing savings
divided by household income). In the mean regression, we find a reduction in the savings rate
of 3.1 percentage points, or about 1500 euros of 2008 non-housing savings. The estimated saving
rates effects at various deciles are of the same order of magnitude as the mean effect, between 2
and 5 percentage points.
These ITT estimates, in conjunction with the summary statistics in Table 3, allow us to calcu-
late counterfactual savings levels and rates for the offered group in 2008. In particular, subtracting
the IIT estimate of (-3.1) percentage points from the observed saving rate of (-0.016) gives a coun-
terfactual saving rate of 1.5% for the offered group in 2008. An analogous calculation gives a
counterfactual saving level of 1,173.
Table 7 presents our main results, obtained from IV regressions of the two savings measures
(levels and rates) on participation in the retirement needs module, where we instrument survey
participation with the random offer of the survey and control for multiple eligibles in the house-
hold. The leftmost column shows the estimated coefficients and accompanying standard errors for
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Table 6: The Effect of Survey Participation on Savings
(ITT Effects)
Decilesa
Mean 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
Dependent variable: 2008 non-housing savings (thousands of euros)
Offered -1.478** -1.502 -0.956** -0.581 -0.499 -0.697* -0.968** -0.791
(0.672) (1.011) (0.475) (0.373) (0.357) (0.382) (0.459) (0.685)
Sample statistics 0.154 -4.935 -2.061 -0.583 0.002 1.060 2.245 4.393
N 999
Dependent variable: 2008 non-housing savings rate (1 = 100%)
Offered -0.0308** -0.0495* -0.0256* -0.0197* -0.0113 -0.0233** -0.0243* -0.0312
(0.0127) (0.0258) (0.0148) (0.0112) (0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0131) (0.0196)
Sample statistics -0.01 -0.14 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.13
N 999
a For decile models we report unconditional treatment effects.
We control for the presence of multiple eligibles.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
the treatment dummy in 2SLS models, which capture the mean effect. Participation in the survey
caused households to save 1,683 euro less on average during 2008. This is a large effect, and can
be compared to the counterfactual saving of the offered group of 1,173 euros.
When we express savings relative to household income, we also find a significant and nega-
tive effect. Survey participation caused households to save 3.5 percentage points less on average,
compared with counterfactual mean saving rate of 1.5% and a standard deviation of 18 percentage
points (both for the offered group). On average, participation in the survey moved households
from modest saving to modest dis-saving.
The remaining columns of Table 7 report quantile IV effects. We report estimates for the second
through eighth deciles in order to show that participation in the retirement needs module affected
subsequent savings throughout the distribution of savings rates. For the level of savings, we find
significant and large effects for the third, sixth and seventh deciles. The estimated coefficients for
the other deciles are also all negative. For the saving rate, we find strongly significant effects at
the third and sixth deciles as well as marginally significant effects at the second and fourth deciles.
These estimates show that large parts of the savings distribution were shifted by participation the
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Table 7: The Effect of Survey Participation on Savings
(IV Treatment Effects)
Decilesa
Mean 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
Dependent variable: 2008 non-housing savings (thousands of euros)
Treated -1.683** -1.792 -1.193** -0.644 -0.474 -0.955** -1.085** -0.784
(0.764) (1.119) (0.552) (0.458) (0.438) (0.461) (0.530) (0.709)
Sample statistics 0.154 -4.935 -2.061 -0.583 0.002 1.060 2.245 4.393
Proportion compliers 0.875
N 999
Dependent variable: 2008 non-housing savings rate (1 = 100%)
Treated -0.0351** -0.0519* -0.0337** -0.0224* -0.00922 -0.0352** -0.0247 -0.0317
(0.0144) (0.0286) (0.0166) (0.0135) (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0153) (0.0208)
Sample statistics -0.01 -0.14 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.13
Proportion compliers 0.875
N 999
a For decile models we report unconditional treatment effects.
We control for the presence of multiple eligibles.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
survey, with similar effect sizes below and above the median. The mean effects reported above are
not driven by responses in the tails of the saving distribution.
We investigated the robustness of these results in a number of other ways as well. In particular,
alternative trimming rules yield quantitatively similar results, as do narrower definitions of wealth
that include only risky assets and bank accounts.8
Our identification is based on the randomised offer of the retirement needs module to a subset
of the eligible panel members. This implies conditional randomisation to households (conditional
on the number of eligibles in a households) and allows us to cleanly measure the causal effect of
interest. Nevertheless, we added to the models reported in Table 7 all the covariates listed in Table
1 and found that all effects are robust to including these additional controls.9
8Assets held in bank accounts and risky investments are provided directly by banks to the tax authority and as a
result are probably measured most accurately. Therefore, we also tried yearly savings in those categories as alternative
outcome variables. Estimates are available on request.
9Estimates available on request.
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The results of this exercise are reported in Table 8. We find no evidence of any systematic difference
in savings behaviour, neither in terms of the mean level or rate of saving, nor at any of the deciles.
Note that, in contrast to Table 7, the coefficients of the various deciles vary in sign. This provides
further assurance that our research design is valid and that our main results are not driven by
incomplete data linkage (as any differential selection into the match sample would also affect the
2007 results).
Table 8: Falsification Tests
(IV Treatment Effects)
Decilesa
Mean 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
Dependent variable: 2007 non-housing savings (thousands of euros)
Treated -0.406 -0.582 0.130 0.158 -0.090 -0.393 -0.684 -1.792
(0.749) (0.889) (0.460) (0.414) (0.417) (0.478) (0.832) (1.251)
Proportion compliers 0.866
N 1,014
Dependent variable: 2007 non-housing savings rate (1 = 100%)
Treated -0.0136 -0.00961 -0.00279 0.00197 -0.00198 -0.00296 -0.0211 -0.0257
(0.0147) (0.0249) (0.0133) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0136) (0.0218) (0.0298)
Proportion compliers 0.866
N 1,014
a For decile models we report unconditional treatment effects.
We control for the presence of multiple eligibles.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
3.5. Effect Heterogeneity
We next investigate effect heterogeneity. One approach would be to run IV analyses on subsam-
ples, but many variables that could be used for interesting splits of the sample are correlated. Ex-
amples are income and education, or income and age. Therefore, we prefer a pooled IV approach,
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in which we interact the treatment (survey participation) dummy with household characteristics,
and then generate additional instruments by interacting our instrument (the offer dummy) with
household characteristics. In addition to the interaction between selected covariates and the treat-
ment dummy, the estimated model includes all the covariates from Table 1 as exogenous indepen-
dent variables. We investigate heterogeneity along the lines of income, education, and age. Note
that, for reasons of sample size, the specification does not contain dummies for all cells defined by
those variables, but only interactions of the separate variables with the treatment indicator.
The upper panel of Table 9 displays coefficient estimates for the main effect and interaction
terms of the model with the savings rate as the dependent variable. According to these estimates,
the survey did not affect the average savings rate of the base group: young, income-poor house-
holds that are poorly educated. We find strong evidence for differential effects along the age and
education dimensions: households with more highly educated or older heads reduced their sav-
ings more after having been offered the retirement needs module. The evidence for effect hetero-
geneity by current income is weaker. Once we allow the treatment effect to interact with education,
the interaction with income is positive (indicating that, conditional on education, households with
higher current income cut saving by less). But the income interaction is only weakly statistically
significant (p¡0.1) and much smaller in magnitude than interaction with higher education. It may
be that education is a better measure of long run economic position or retirement preparedness.
We then use the coefficients of this model to calculate treatment effects for households with
different combinations of characteristics. These are reported in the lower panel of Table 9. Partici-
pation actually raised the saving rate of households with poorly educated heads who are younger
than 40 and have a disposable income above the sample median by 8 percentage points (though
this effect is not particularly precise). Households in the highest education category saved less
regardless of the age of the head and their household income, but we find the strongest effects for
older households: the mean treatment effect is -3/-9 percentage points for households below age
40; -5/-11 percentage points for age 40-54; and -12/-17 percentage points for households aged 55
or older. We find similar heterogeneity in the survey effect on the level of savings.10
10Estimates available on request.
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Table 9: Heterogeneous IV Treatment Effects – Savings Rate
Dependent variable: 2008 savings rate (1 = 100%)
Treated 0.0283
(0.0347)
Treated × HH inc. high 0.0526*
(0.0301)
Treated × educ. middle -0.0172
(0.0363)
Treated × educ. high -0.115***
(0.0355)
Treated × age 40-54 -0.0249
(0.0337)
Treated × age 55+ -0.0838**
(0.0380)
Controls Yes
R-squared 0.0586
N 999
Heterogeneous effects
Income below median Income above median
Education Education
Low Middle High Low Middle High
Age <40 0.0283 0.0112 -0.0862*** 0.0809* 0.0637* -0.0336
(0.0347) (0.0305) (0.0323) (0.0427) (0.0355) (0.0337)
Age 40-54 0.00348 -0.0137 -0.111*** 0.0560 0.0389 -0.0585*
(0.0337) (0.0349) (0.0367) (0.0351) (0.0319) (0.0301)
Age 55+ -0.0555* -0.0727* -0.170*** -0.00293 -0.0201 -0.117***
(0.0308) (0.0395) (0.0385) (0.0387) (0.0426) (0.0388)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Overall, Table 9 shows that the size of the effect of survey participation on saving is much
larger for the highly educated (college and university graduates). In addition, we also investigated
effect heterogeneity by gender and family type, and whether the number of household members
participating matters. In particular, we checked whether the effect differs depending on whether
the individual(-s) who received the offer is a husband; a wife; both husband and wife; a single
male; or a single female. However, with our sample size, we are unable to discern differential
effects depending on whether men or women were offered the survey, or whether one or two
household members were offered the survey. These estimates are available on request.
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Next we further explored potential sources of the significant effect heterogeneity across edu-
cation groups. The various estimates underlying the results discussed below are not presented in
tables, but again are available on request.
Households in the highest education group have higher rates of home ownership. They also
have higher pension wealth in terms of a standardised annuity from the first two (mandatory)
pillars of the pension system: the median predicted annuity, net of taxes, is 1,442 euro/month
for poorly educated households, compared with 1,725 and 2,039 euro/month respectively for the
higher education groups. However, the replacement rate of the projected annuity relative to cur-
rent income is similar for all education groups, ranging from 79% to 81%. Conditional on educa-
tion, neither home ownership nor either measure of pension wealth further significantly interacts
with the treatment effect. This suggests that differences in financial circumstances may not drive
the heterogeneity in treatment effects across education groups.
An alternative hypothesis is that the education groups differ in the way the survey affects at-
tention to retirement saving and needs. However, there is no significant difference in their reported
rates of thinking about retirement prior to the survey. The high education group answer the sur-
vey more quickly than the low education group (median difference 2 minutes, p = 0.058), but the
difference between the high education and middle income groups is not statistically significant.
Moreover, we find no significant interaction between treatment effect and survey response time.
A question in the retirement needs module elicited subjects’ expectations of housing costs in
retirement. Interestingly, relative to low education households, highly educated households are
much more likely to expect a decrease in housing costs after retirement. These differences are
economically and statistically significant (p < 0.001). Unfortunately, as this question was asked
in the retirement needs module, i.e. only of treated sample, we cannot test for treatment effect
heterogeneity in this specific dimension. Nevertheless, this difference raises the possibility that
the survey made salient to high education households likely decreases in housing expenditure
after retirement.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le 3.6. Evidence on Portfolio EffectsFinally, we consider whether the observed effect of survey participation on household savingmight reflect portfolio reshuffling rather changes in active saving. There are two concerns. First, as
explained in section 2.3, the administrative wealth data do not contain information on a relatively
small category of tax-favoured savings accounts. Though these are not a major asset category in
the Netherlands, it remains possible that our findings of a negative effect of survey participation on
non-housing savings results from a re-allocation of assets to those accounts. Second, our wealth-
based measure of saving contains both active saving and capital gains. A possibility is that treated
households shifted saving to risky assets and then experienced significant losses with the onset
of the financial crisis in 2008. Changes in active saving and changes in portfolio allocation would
both be a survey effect, but it is important and interesting to distinguish the nature of the effect.
With respect to the first point, we used survey data from the LISS assets module to look at
investments in these tax-favoured saving accounts. We tested for survey effects on accounts on
both extensive and intensive margins. We find no effect on participation in such accounts, change
in participation, balances conditional on participation or unconditional balances11. While the sur-
vey data may be quite noisy at the intensive margin, we believe the participation is relatively
well-measured. Turning to the second point, we use the administrative wealth data to test for an
effect of survey participation on the portfolio share of risky assets, participation in risky assets, or
changes in either shares or participation.12 We do not find any evidence to suggest that capital
gains for risky assets drive the survey effects that we document. Moreover, we also find survey
effects when we limit our attention to changes in the balance of saving accounts, an asset class that
does not exhibit large price-driven variation in value. These checks point to the effect documented
above being an effect on active saving, and not an affect on portfolio allocation.
11In all these regressions, we find p > 0.3 for the effect of the treatment dummy; estimates are available on request.
12Estimates are available on request.
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le 4. Discussion and ConclusionIn this paper, we show that participating in a non-informative survey module on retirement needsled Dutch households to save significantly less. Our analysis uses administrative wealth data to
calculate clean measures of savings that are not contaminated by the reporting styles of survey
respondents, which themselves might have been affected by the intervention. Participation in the
survey is instrumented by randomised assignment of invitations to participate in the module, so
our estimates are unaffected by endogenous compliance. Estimated effects are large: the saving
rate (saving as a fraction of disposable income) is 3.5 percentage points lower among treated house-
holds (on a base saving rate of 1.5%). Our wealth data only allow us to compute savings during
2007 and 2008. Naturally we will investigate the durability of the effects when more data becomes
available.
Quantile IV models show effects across a wide range of the savings distribution. Falsification
checks reveal no effect on savings prior to the survey. We find evidence for heterogeneous treat-
ment effects. The mean effect is driven by older and highly educated households. These house-
holds have the highest expected pension wealth and higher housing wealth. They are also much
more likely, in the survey, to report that their housing costs will fall in retirement (perhaps because
they anticipate paying off their mortgage debt).
Our results are consistent with limited attention (DellaVigna, 2009). The survey may have made
aspects of retirement needs and retirement planning more salient to participants. After reflecting
on their expenditure needs in retirement, older and highly educated households concluded that
they can afford to save less while the young and poorly educated marginally increased their sav-
ings. Asymmetric costs of adjustment may also be relevant. If the survey led some participants
to conclude that they were saving too much, and some to conclude they were saving too little, the
former may have found it easier to adjust. They only need to consume more.
These results are likely specific to the context of the experiment. At the time the retirement
needs module was fielded in 2008, mandatory pensions were generous, replacing 80% of final in-
come after tax on average, and covered nearly the entire population. De Bresser and Knoef (2015)
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show that many Dutch households were over-saving, relative to their self-reported desired expen-
diture level in retirement. They also show that more educated households could look forward to
higher occupational pensions. Moreover, financial institutions were obliged to provide all pen-
sion holders with Universal Pensions Overviews (UPOs) from 2008 onward. This may have meant
that households whose attention was drawn to their retirement needs and plans could obtain in-
formation on current entitlements and projections for age 65 at very low cost. It is not clear how
households would react to the salience shock of the survey if they were largely under-saving (espe-
cially if adjustment costs are asymmetric), or if information on retirement preparedness was costly
to obtain.
While effects likely due to limited attention have been documented previously (Stango and
Zinman, 2013), our results highlight that such effects can operate in surprising directions depend-
ing on the context. We also show that the patterns of heterogeneous effects are context specific. We
find the largest effects for the most educated while Stango and Zinman (2013) find the opposite.
Perhaps most importantly, we show that such effects can operate on the most central of life-cycle
choices, such as the level of consumption and saving. These salience effects might be exploited for
purposes of pension policy. But it is only through the continued accumulation of evidence on how
salience shocks manifest in widely-varied contexts, and with respect to different outcomes, that
general models of these effects can be formulated and convincingly tested.
The validity of empirical research that uses survey data relies on the representativeness of
the sample.13 Survey effects such as the one documented in this paper imply that panels may
not be representative of the underlying population even if the initial sampling was representative
and the representativeness of the panel has not been degraded by attrition or non-response. If
survey participation alters the behaviour of respondents, the external validity of any study based
on such data will be compromised. Moreover, if the behaviour of survey participants is altered by
participation, new ethical issues arise in survey research. This issue is already being debated in
the public health literature (Fitzsimons and Moore, 2008; Schwarz, 2008).
Such considerations may be a further argument for greater use of administrative data whenever
13A recent example is Heffetz and Rabin (2013) who use survey measures of subjective well-being to illustrate the
selection problems that arise from survey nonresponse.
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available (Einav and Levin, 2014).14 Also, as noted by Zwane et al. (2011), survey effects may mean
that it is better to achieve statistical power with large panels and infrequent measurement rather
than with smaller, but more frequently measured samples.
In their recent survey, Warren and Halpern-Manners (2012) call for more research on panel con-
ditioning and survey effects that employs experimental or quasi-experimental designs, and which
documents effects in the kinds of large-scale longitudinal surveys that underpin much research
in the social sciences. Our analysis shows one way in which this can be done: by exploiting the
randomisation of content that is becoming more common in such surveys. We strongly support
their call for further research.
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